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ANTIRACKETEERING ACT NOT APPLICABLE TO LABOR

UNIONS - Defendant Teamsters Union and twenty-six individual defendants
were convicted for the violation of the Antiracketeering Act.1 Defendants had
by threats of violence forced the owners of all trucks entering the city of New
· York to pay members of defendant union the regular union wage for driving
and unloading a truck regardless of whether the tendered services were accepted. 2 Held, the act was not intended to apply to such labor activity,8 and
defendant did not violate the act if the money was received with the intention
of rendering services therefor, even if the services were not accepted. Such
payments constituted "bona fide wages," the payment of which was exempted
from the operation of the act. United States v. Local 807 of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 62 S. Ct. 642 (1942).
The instant decision marks still another defeat for the Department of Justice
in its attempt to subject labor unions to federal criminal sanctions 4. and is in
line with the recent trend of the Supreme Court to construe federal legislation

1 48 Stat. L. 979, 18 U. S. C. (1940), § 420a et seq. The act provided that it
was a crime to exact the payment of money under threat of or use of violence if it in
any manner affected interstate commerce.
2 The charge was $9.42 for each large truck and $8.41 for each small one.
The evidence was conflicting, but it appeared that in some cases services were actually
rendered in return for the payments, and in others it was clear that there was no
intent to perform any services even if they were .requested. There was a record of
the use of violence to enforce the union demands. Many of the truck drivers that had
driven the trucks into New York were members of unions but they belonged to the
locals at the points of origin of the haul.
8 The act excluded from -its operation the "payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee." 48 Stat. L. 979, 18 U. S. C. (1940), § 420b (b).
Another section said "no court of the United States shall construe or apply any of the
provisions of this Act in such manner as to impair, diminish, or in any manner affect the
rights of bona fide labor organizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof, as such rights are expressed in the existing statutes of the United States." 48
Stat. L. 980, § 6, 18 U. S. C. (1940), § 420d.
. .
·4 The case was originally tried under the Antiracketeering Act and under the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U. C. S. (1940), § I et seq. The circuit
court below reversed the convictions under the Sherman Act and the government did
not appeal from this part of the judgment. (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 684.
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most favorably in favor of labor groups. 5 The Court relied. heavily on legislative history in holding that the act was designed to enable the federal government to proceed against criminal racketeers of the "Kelley and Dillinger" types
whose shakedowns of business for so-called protection had reached scandalous
proportions when the act was passed.6 The Court refers to the fact that after
consultation with the head of the American Federation of Labor, the bill was
revised to assume its present form, which expressly provides that payment of
wages is not within the meaning of the act and that the act is not" to be construed as depriving labor of any rights that it now has by virtue of existing law. 7
This language was held. to mean that the intent with which the union members
exacted their payments determines whether those payments constitute "wages"
as the term is used in the act. If the defendants intended to render services in
return for the payments, then the payments constituted wages. Under this analysis it becomes quite immaterial what motivated the employer in making these
payments, whether it was the desire to pay for services or to buy protection. 8
By the same token it becomes quite immaterial that the defendants resorted to
violence. in enforcing their demands. It is not necessary that the defendants
be existing employees before the payments to them constituted "wages." The
very crux of any labor union activity is to procure jobs for the members, and it
would restrict the present act too narrowly to say that it protects only those who
have already secured. employment. Congress was familiar with this sort of labor
. practice when the act was passed, so it was one of the ordinary union activities
that it intended to lea,ve unaffected.9 Undoubtedly, the decision in the instant case
renders the statute largely nugatory as a means of imposing sanctions against
5 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940); United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941). See also New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 58 S. Ct. 703 (1938); Lauf v. E. G.
Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578 (1938).
6 See Cummings, "Immediate Problems for the Bar," 20 A. B. A. J. 212 (1934);
Chamberlain, "Federi,J Criminal Statutes," 20 A. B. A. J. 501 (1934); 48 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1935); 21 VA. L. REv. 568 (1935).
1 See note 3, supra.
8 Chief Justice Stone, writing a vigorous dissent, said that to adopt the view
of the majority that the guilt of the defendants is personal and cannot be made to rest
upon the acts of another would "render common law robbery an innocent pastime."
315 U. S. at 540.
9 The Court cited the "stand-by" device that had long been used by musicians
unions. It is a common practice that when a visiting orchestra comes within the territorial jurisdiction of a musicians' local, it must substitute members of the local for
its own members or at least pay them the union wages even though these people would
do nothing but hold themselves available if their services -would be required. This
practice is conceded to be legitimate. Chief Justice Stone said of this argument, that
when the Antiracketeering Act was before Congress, "no member of Congress and no
labor leader had the temerity to suggest that such payments, made only to secure immunity from violence and compelled by assault and battery, could be regarded as the
payment of 'wages by a bona fide employer' or that compulsion of such payments is a
legitimate object of a labor union, or was ever made so by any statute of the United
States." 315 U. S. at 541.
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union misconduct.10 That the act do.es retain some vitality is evidenced by a
circuit court ruling that this act does apply where the union pressure is employed
to exact the payments for the personal benefit of the union leaders, but not
where the payments are made for the benefit of the entire union membership.11
Harry M. Nayer

10 On March 27, Rep. Hobbs introduced a bill in the House of Representatives,
H. R. 6872, 77th Cong., 2d sess., designed to amend the present statute in light of the
decision in the instant case. The · proposed bill would re-enact the present statute
without any exceptions, whatsoever, in favor of labor. See Editorial, NEW YORK
TIMES, March 27, 1942, p. 22:2.
11 Nick v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 660, cert. den. 314
U.S. 687, 62 S. Ct. 302 (1941), rehearing den. 314 U.S. 712, 62 S. Ct. 4II (1941).

